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 Executive Summary 
 
Laws and regulations have both benefits and costs, comparisons of which provide useful 
information. When such benefits and costs occur over time it is normal practice to discount them, 
with costs in the distant future considered less important than those occurring in the present, and 
distant benefits less valuable than present benefits. Conventionally, this discounting is done at a 
constant rate each period—so-called exponential discounting— with both cost and benefit 
streams being treated as if they were financial assets. However, humans are not exponential 
discounters. Rather, people tend to discount more than exponentially in the short run but less 
than exponentially in the long run. Such ‘hyperbolic’ discounting is empirically ubiquitous but 
neglected administratively. The recent ‘data quality act’ requires that information utilized by 
Federal agencies “adhere to a basic standard of quality, including objectivity, utility and 
integrity.” Here we argue that exponential discounting of many benefit streams—particularly 
non-pecuniary ones—fails the ‘data quality’ test and should be abandoned in favor of 
empirically-observed hyperbolic discounting. 
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The value of an economic good today is greater than its value tomorrow—its future value 
is discounted relative to its present value. This simple idea has been the source of controversy at 
least since the time of Ancient Greece. Because a dollar tomorrow is less valuable than a dollar 
today, money-lenders have demanded a premium—interest or usury—for monies loaned. Both 
Plato and Socrates thought that charging interest was unjustifiable. However, as everyone with a 
home mortgage or car loan knows, the practice of charging interest is now the norm. 
Today we understand that there are both psychological and social dimensions to 
discounting over time. Most people exhibit pure time preference in their behavior, preferring to 
have economic goods today instead of tomorrow when given a choice—the good today is 
apparently more valuable than the same good tomorrow. 
The social dimension enters in through the prevailing rate of interest. Whether interest 
rates are high or low depends on the supply of capital to be borrowed and on the demand for 
such borrowing. It is standard to interpret high rates as signifying that capital is scarce while low 
rates mean the opposite. Interest rates are a measure of the social return to capital. 
 
2. Exponential Discounting 
 
Conventionally, discount calculations are performed via a constant period-to-period 
interest rate, leading to an exponential discount function. The origin of this method was its 
simplicity, and it is ubiquitous today. 
Exponential discounting turns out to be the only time consistent way to value goods over 
time. That is, a decision made today on the basis of exponential discounting will continue to be 
the correct decision when re-evaluated in the future. Non-exponential discounting generates time 
inconsistency, in which decisions made in the present may not be viewed as correct in the future. 
Essentially all discount computations today—in the economy, in the economics research 
literature, and in government affairs—are performed using exponential discounting.   2
The only adjustable parameter in this formalism is the discount rate. In practice it may 
vary substantially across domains, as when one rate is used for Federal borrowing while a 
different rate is employed for evaluating an environmental regulation. Any particular rate may 
also vary substantially with time, especially insofar as markets are increasingly being used to 
determine the appropriate rate in specific domains, e.g., mortgage lending. This temporal 
variation in rates can cause even exponential discounting to be time inconsistent, ex post. 
 
3. Discount Rate Heterogeneity 
 
At any instant of time there is significant heterogeneity in the discount rates emerging 
from market processes and therefore in those being used commercially and in government. One 
need only peruse the real estate section of their local newspaper to find great variety of rates, as 
well as other charges, being advertised by lenders. Some of these differences are domain-
specific, as when used car interest rates exceed mortgage rates. Other times they survive within 
particular domains, as in the mortgage market where, for a particular product—a 30 year 
mortgage, for example—there is a significant distribution of rates available to potential 
borrowers. 
Ostensibly, the most important question in the administrative application of discounting 
to public policy is finding the right discount rate to use, particularly in non-market environments 
or other areas having weak connection to markets, such as basic research. Indeed, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) regularly issues formal guidance for the appropriate discount 
rate to use for Federal projects. These numbers have been in the 4-6% range recently, after being 
more commonly in the 6-8% range during the 1990s. 
Interestingly, it turns out that a portfolio of projects having a distribution of discount rates 
does not display exponential discounting overall. Rather, any significant discount rate 
heterogeneity is sufficient to produce non-exponential discounting, and therefore ostensibly time 
inconsistent behavior. Discount rate heterogeneity is, therefore, one reason to consider non-
exponential discounting. Another is that most people don’t behave in accord with exponential 
discounting. 
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4. Behavioral Discounting 
 
The peculiar thing about discounting is that while all people do it, no one seems to do it 
perfectly consistently, in the way that exponential discounting demands. Rather, actual 
discounting is more hyperbolic—people discount the short run more than exponential and the 
long run less. Myriad empirical studies have demonstrated this under a wide variety of 
conditions, with human subjects motivated in many different ways. Indeed, this phenomenon is 
so ubiquitous in experimental economics as to stand today as one of the pillars of behavioral 
economics, a burgeoning sub-field within economics and for which a Nobel Prize was awarded a 
few years back. 
The careful, reproducible studies of the experimental economists have really just 
confirmed and reinforced what behavioral scientists have long known—that people do not judge 
the future in a consistent way. For a whole industry is built around this facet of human behavior: 
the credit card industry. 
Credit cards are an integral part of American life today. They are a convenience for 
shopping and nothing more for those who pay their entire balance each month. For those who 
don’t pay off their balance, credit cards also provide easy access to capital. The typical American 
family with credit card debt owes some $8,000, a significant fraction of the $54,000 median 
family income in the U.S. in 2004. Thus the credit card business is a $1.5 trillion industry today. 
Hyperbolic discounting has emerged as a consensus explanation for the existence of such 
high credit card balances. People decide to make purchases today and pay tomorrow. Tomorrow 
they repeat this behavior, and soon they have large balances that take a long time to pay back. 
Credit card debt is but one clear example of people engaging in time inconsistent behavior. 
Commitment devices to promote savings, such as penalties for early withdrawal, further 
exemplify the importance of taking hyperbolic discounting into account. The existence of such 
devices gives a non-exponential discounter some assurance that her present savings will not be 
raided by her future self. In a world of perfect exponential discounters such devices would not 
serve a useful function, but they are widespread today, and behavioral economists argue that 
perhaps we could use more. 
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5. Financial Costs and Non-Financial Benefits of Public Policy 
 
Governments make major use of the discounting calculus in cost-benefit analysis, 
especially by agencies involved in regulatory activities. Here it is conventional to discount both 
costs and benefits, although often costs are borne primarily up-front while benefits are realized in 
the future. 
Since 1981, the Federal government has attempted to put the use cost-benefit analysis on 
a systematic footing, going so far as to require it for many regulatory evaluations and certain 
legal analyses. When costs for a particular project or regulation are borne over time, they are 
discounted in accord with prevailing interest rates in the market place. And when benefits accrue 
to either government or citizens over time, such as when an environmental regulation yields a 
stream of pollution tax payments or reduced health care costs, these sums too are discounted in 
accord with market conditions. Rational assessment of costs and benefits occurring over different 
periods requires some version of such a calculus. 
There are many government activities that, while their costs are certainly monetary and 
usually borne up front, the stream of benefits is often diffuse, perhaps divided over thousands or 
millions of individuals, over great lengths of time, and most importantly, may not have any 
natural monetary expression. 
For example, when the U.S. National Park Service was born in 1916, the fact that it 
would provide great benefits to generations of Americans would have been obvious to Theodore 
Roosevelt and others who had begun setting land aside for “public used, resort, and 
recreation…inalienable for time.” That the benefits of the parks are largely non-monetary would 
not have been in dispute in the early 20
th Century. 
The non-financial character of benefit streams has not stopped economists from trying to 
assign monetary value to them. Beginning some 20 years ago a host of novel ‘value elicitation’ 
techniques were developed to try and tease out from people the values they implicitly assign to 
such intangibles as waiting in traffic, visiting a National Park, and so on. While many numbers 
have been calculated and back-calculated from such surveys, interviews, ‘revealed preference’ 
analyses, and related methods, suffice it to say there that these techniques have so far yielded 
estimates of use or existence values that are of dubious reliability. More problematically, it has   5
often been the case that such monetized benefits have been calculated on a per period (e.g., 
annual) basis and then discounted using conventional exponential discounting. 
 
6. Hyperbolic Discounting of Non-Pecuniary Value Streams 
 
Given the non-financial character of many benefit streams accruing to government 
projects, a much more satisfactory methodology would be to discount such benefits the way 
people apparently do, that is, hyperbolically. Indeed, this is the only scientifically justifiable 
approach to discounting behavior, given the wealth of data on how humans actually behave. 
Hyperbolic discounting of benefits suggests a new way of thinking about benefit-cost 
analysis. In the conventional calculus, benefits and costs are discounted identically and 
exponentially, so there is a natural sense of direct comparability of these two distinct streams. An 
analyst performs sensitivity tests on his results—that a particular project has benefits that exceed 
costs and so should be undertaken, or else the reverse—in order to determine the extent to which 
they depend on, for example, the assumed discount rate. For projects defined by large up-front 
costs and benefits that appear far downstream, there is typically some critical value of the 
discount rate such that the project—no matter how large the ultimate benefits—becomes 
untenable. Below this critical discount rate the project is viable. 
But with hyperbolic discounting this simple connection between costs and benefits is 
broken, for while the cost of capital may ebb and flow with market conditions, there is little 
evidence that people’s intrinsic discounting behavior is significantly modified by such changes. 
High market interest rates might even be good for project feasibility when evaluated in this 
hyperbolic way, for it could induce some of the costs to be shifted in a way more suited to 
people’s actual time preferences. 
Consider an example: Imagine a project with $1 billion up-front costs that saves 10 lives 
annually, in perpetuity. At a 5% discount rate, the value of a human life needed for the project to 
be marginal is $4.76 million; for larger values, the project is worthwhile. Substituting hyperbolic 
discounting of the project’s benefits yields, for a reasonable parameterization, a marginal value 
of $4.08 million for a human life. However, this can fall to as little as $1.00 million for discount 
functions imputed from survey data. Clearly, hyperbolic discounting lowers the threshold for 
public investment when the costs are borne early-on and the benefits are long-lived.   6
7. A New Rationale for Public Goods: Current Citizens and Future Benefits 
 
More generally, conventional discounting of costs coupled with behavioral discounting of 
benefits can be viewed as a novel rationale for social  investment. For the use of hyperbolic 
discounting to value benefit streams should yield policies that are more commensurate with the 
desires of citizens. To see this, consider again the credit card industry. Credit card companies 
make profits by lending people money at exponential rates while people are assessing the 
benefits of the goods they buy with this money at non-exponential rates. In effect, the companies 
are arbitraging a person’s current self against his or her future self, giving money to the current 
person with the knowledge that the future person will repay it with interest. The credit industry 
thrives because of this arbitrage opportunity. 
Having government play the role of arbitraging one generation’s borrowing so that future 
generations will be better off is as old as public finance. And many important projects—national 
defense and highways, local schools and roads, state research universities—have grown up 
exactly this way, presumably with their benefits outweighing their costs. What is novel about 
inserting hyperbolic discounting into these otherwise mundane administrative affairs is that the 
resulting policy decisions—either to undertake particular projects or not—would be much more 
in line with people’s wishes. That is, if the data and procedures employed by regulators more 
accurately represent actual human behavior then the resulting decisions should be less 
contentious, more attuned to people’s underlying values. 
 
8. The Data QualityAct 
 
The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2000, that year’s omnibus 
spending bill, contained brief language directing the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
to issue guidelines to maximize “the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of 
information…disseminated by Federal agencies.” This has been interpreted by the OMB Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as requiring the federal government to make 
decisions on the basis of “sound science,” certainly a laudable goal. The ‘data quality act’ has 
been invoked to mandate that regulatory assessments take into account all available scientific 
studies, concerning product safety, for example. Here we suggest that it can also be used to   7
compel regulators to employ the best research on how people actually discount the future, 




People don’t discount future streams of goods and services in the way that economics 
textbooks teach. People care less about the near term but more about the long run than prescribed 
by the formalism currently in place administratively for benefit-cost analyses. This needs to be 
changed and the Federal government can be compelled to do so through the ‘data quality act.’ 
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